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IS THE STATE THE LAST HEIR? 
John V. Orth† 
TRICTLY SPEAKING, escheat applies only to real property. If a 
landowner dies without a valid will or known heir,1 the 
property escheats to the state. Nowadays escheat can also 
refer to personal property.2 If the same person dies owning 
chattels as well as land, the now unowned personal property also 
passes to the state. And, because the state takes possession of cer-
tain items of unclaimed personal property, such as inactive bank 
accounts, these too are loosely said to escheat. 
There is, obviously, a practical reason to treat all these cases – 
real and personal property left by an owner who dies without a will 
or legal heir as well as personal property that is unclaimed – as in-
stances of escheat. In each case, the result is the same: the state 
                                                                                                
† John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. This article is the tenth in his series of reappraisals in the law of 
property. 
1 The emphasis is on known heir. If the state’s inheritance law admits kindred of any 
degree, then no one actually dies without an heir. More than two hundred years 
ago, Sir William Blackstone stated the obvious: “All men are in some degree re-
lated to each other.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 205 (FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, University of 
Chicago Press). The problem is establishing the exact degree of kinship. 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (8th ed. 2004) defines escheat as “[r]eversion of 
property (esp. real property) to the state upon the death of an owner who has 
neither a will nor any legal heirs.” 
S 
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takes possession. But although the property ends up in the same 
place, the historical and theoretical routes that lead to that destina-
tion are quite different. And the titles by which the state holds the 
various types of escheated property are also different – which may 
have practical implications even today. 
REAL PROPERTY 
scheat was an incident of feudal tenure. The legal theory of the 
effect of the Conquest of England in 1066 by Duke William of 
Normandy, which made him King William I (“the Conqueror”), 
was that all land belonged to the king by right of conquest. When 
William granted out estates to his vassals, he retained his overlord-
ship, which entitled him and his successors to the land when those 
estates came to an end. In the case of life estates, the death of the 
life tenant obviously ended the estate. In the case of estates in fee 
simple, which can endure forever,3 the estate ended if the owner 
died without a valid will or known heir.4 
Under feudalism it was essential that the person possessed of the 
right to the land – the one seized of the estate – could be identified 
at all times. There could be “no gap in seisin.”5 This was because the 
feudal estate owed duties to the lord that had to be discharged by 
                                                                                                
3 See, e.g., 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *4 (Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873) (“No estate is deemed a fee, unless it may con-
tinue forever.”). 
4 Prior to the adoption of the first Statute of Wills in 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, real 
property could not be devised. Also in pre-modern times, estates escheated if the 
tenant committed a felony (propter delictum tenentis). 3 Blackstone, supra note 1, at 
258. Forfeiture as a punishment for felony is unknown in the United States, and 
the Federal Constitution limits the power of Congress to punish even those con-
victed of treason. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to 
declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Cor-
ruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”). 
State constitutions may have similar restrictions. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 29 
(“No conviction of treason [against the state] or attainder shall work corruption of 
blood or forfeiture.”). 
5 See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
OF REAL PROPERTY 30 (3d ed. 2002). 
E 
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the person with seisin. On the death of a person seised in fee sim-
ple, seisin passed immediately to the decedent’s heir.6 To this day, 
that remains the theory of inheritance of land. If no heir was imme-
diately identifiable, a legal officer held a proceeding known as an 
inquest of office to determine if the property had escheated, that is, 
reverted to the Crown “from defect of heirs” (propter defectum san-
guinis). 
When the American colonies of Great Britain became independ-
ent states in 1776, they succeeded to the Crown’s right of escheat. 
After the formation of the federal union, the national government 
did not assert a claim to escheated property, presumably on the 
view that, as a government of delegated powers, it had not been 
granted that aspect of sovereignty. Even in states formed out of af-
ter-acquired territories, such as those in the Old Northwest and 
those acquired by the Louisiana Purchase, the federal government 
never claimed a right to escheats, presumably on the ground that 
new states entered the union with the same legal rights as earlier 
ones.7 
In the common-law canons of descent, listing the order in which 
heirs succeeded to land, the Crown (or, in America, the state) did 
not appear.8 Instead, escheat was understood as the recognition of 
an underlying – or, perhaps better, an overlying – title. As the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska once explained: 
Clearly the theory of the law in the United States . . . is 
that first and originally the state was the proprietor of all 
real property and last and ultimately will be its proprietor, 
and what is commonly termed ownership is in fact but ten-
ancy . . . . When this tenancy expires or is exhausted by 
reason of the failure of the state or the law to recognize any 
                                                                                                
6 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 201. 
7 The principle had been established by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, origi-
nally adopted under the Articles of Confederation on July 13, 1787, confirmed 
and adapted to the United States Constitution on August 7, 1789 (1 U.S. Stat. 
50) (new states to be admitted “on an equal footing with the original States”). 
8 For England, see 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 208-36; for America, see 4 
KENT, supra note 3, at *375-*412. 
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person or persons in whom such tenancy can be continued, 
then the real estate reverts to and falls back upon its origi-
nal and ultimate proprietor, or, in other words, escheats to 
the state.9 
As the law concerning intestate succession became codified, the 
practice arose for simplicity’s sake of listing the state as the ultimate 
taker, and as heirs came to be defined as “those who take the prop-
erty under the relevant statutes of descent,”10 the state became in 
that sense – and in that sense only – the “last heir.” But the state was 
never a true heir. Notoriously, an heir has no rights in the property 
while the ancestor lives, only a “mere expectancy,”11 but the state 
has a right all along, a paramount title – at least, as to real property. 
UNOWNED PERSONAL PROPERTY 
eudal incidents, including escheat from defect of heirs, applied 
only to land, not to chattels. The explanation is historical. 
When feudalism emerged, land was essentially the only source of 
wealth. The land was what King William had taken by conquest, 
and it was the land that he apportioned among his loyal retainers. 
Chattels were not held of any overlord; they were – in a word bor-
rowed from Roman law – “allodial,” subject to absolute ownership, 
not feudal. When, over time, personal property assumed more im-
portance, the question arose of succession on the death of an owner 
                                                                                                
9 In re O’Connor’s Estate, 252 N.W. 826, 827 (Neb. 1934). Two state constitu-
tions have something similar: S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (“The people of the State 
are declared to possess the ultimate property in and to all lands within the juris-
diction of the State; and all lands the title to which shall fail from defect of heirs 
shall revert or escheat to the people.”); WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (“The people of 
the state, in their right of sovereignty, are declared to possess the ultimate prop-
erty in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the state; and all lands the title to 
which shall fail from a defect of heirs shall revert or escheat to the people.”). 
10 JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 258 (8th ed. 
2008). 
11 See HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER 
INTERESTS IN LAND § 172 (Renard Berman ed., abr. 3d ed. 1970). Technically 
while the ancestor lives, there are no heirs. Nemo est haeres viventis. 3 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 1, at 224. 
F 
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of personal property without a valid will or known heir. Escheat, or 
rather its practical effect, crossed the artificial barrier that separated 
land and chattels. For want of any better label, ownerless personal 
property was styled bona vacantia – vacant, that is, unowned goods12 
– and was taken by the Crown, probably because it was the royal 
courts that decided the matter. By the mid-eighteenth century, 
Lord Mansfield could lay it down that “[i]n personal estates, which 
are allodial by law, the king is last heir where no kin[.]”13 
Ironically, in England, where it all began, escheat has been abol-
ished, replaced by a right in the Crown to take land as bona vacantia 
in the same way that it takes goods.14 In America a few states, in a 
burst of republican ardor, constitutionalized the rule that estates in 
land are allodial and that feudal incidents are not allowed, without, 
however, abandoning their claim to escheats.15 Further confounding 
the old distinction between real and personal property, the intestate 
succession acts in most states now treat both real and personal 
property identically.16 So it appears that indeed the state is the last 
heir with respect both to land and to chattels.17 
                                                                                                
12 Although bona vacantia as used in this article refers only to personal property left 
unowned at the death of an owner without heirs or valid will, historically it could 
be used to refer to any personal property for which no owner could be identified. 
See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 288 (listing “royal fish, shipwrecks, 
treasure trove, waifs, and estrays”). 
13 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden 177, 229, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 672 (Ch. 1759). 
14 15 Geo. 5, c. 3, § 41(1) & 46 (1925). 
15 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 28 (“All lands in this State are declared to be allodial; and 
feudal tenures of every description, with all their incidents, are prohibited.”); 
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“All lands within the state are allodial and feudal ten-
ures of every description with all their incidents are prohibited.”); WIS. CONST. 
art. I, § 14 (“All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal ten-
ures are prohibited.”). 
16 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 33 (7th ed. 2005). 
But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (2007) (continuing distinction between real and 
personal property where decedent is survived by a spouse and one or more de-
scendants).  
17 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-711 (1990, amended 1993) (italics added): 
If an applicable statute or a governing instrument calls for a present or fu-
ture distribution to or creates a present or future interest in a designated 
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UNCLAIMED PERSONAL PROPERTY 
uch personal property also passes to the state today other 
than by intestate succession. Under the circumstances of 
modern economic life, large amounts of property are held by cor-
porations or similar entities on behalf of individuals: deposit ac-
counts, amounts due for interest or dividends, customers’ over-
payments, employees’ unpaid wages, tenants’ security deposits, 
stocks, bonds, proceeds of insurance policies, the contents of safe 
deposit boxes, and many more.18 Pursuant to legislation, states take 
possession of such property if its owner initiates no action with re-
spect to it for a specified number of years19 and provide publication 
notice to the owner.20 The practical reason behind the states’ action 
is to prevent unclaimed personal property being eventually appro-
priated by the present holder.21 The states are better able to provide 
                                                                                                
individual’s “heirs,” “heirs at law,” “next of kin,” “relatives,” or “family,” 
or language of similar import, the property passes to those persons, in-
cluding the state . . . . 
18 For an even longer list, see UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 1(13) (1995). See also 
Rose’s Stores, Inc. v. Boyles, 416 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (“escheat” of 
abandoned layaway payments). Of course, holders of the property of others do 
not have to be corporations, although they usually are. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED 
PROP. ACT § 1(6) (1995) (defining “holder” as “a person obligated to hold for the 
account of, or deliver or pay to, the owner property that is subject to this 
[Act].”); id. § 1(12) (defining “person” to mean “an individual, business associa-
tion, financial organization, estate, trust, government, governmental subdivision, 
agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.”). 
19 See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 2(a) (1995) (period of inactivity varies from 
one to fifteen years, depending on the type of property). 
20 Id. § 9 (notice in “a newspaper of general circulation in the [county] of this State 
in which is located the last known address of any person named in the notice”). 
21 “Many retailers shift unused gift-card credits from a liability account to an income 
account . . . .” Erica Alini, Governments Grab Unused Gift Cards, WALL ST. J., June 
30, 2009, at A3 (citing filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
annual financial statements). The states generally make no claim to unclaimed 
personal property not in the possession of a holder, that is, to personal property 
that is lost or abandoned, such as an item found on the public street. In this case, 
the owner did not intentionally transfer possession to another to hold on his be-
half. For a critical reappraisal of the law of finders, see John V. Orth, “What’s 
M 
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long-term (perpetual) custody. In addition, it is sometimes admit-
ted that the statutes are also a means of raising revenue.22 Many 
states dedicate unclaimed personal property, along with escheats, to 
the support of education.23 
                                                                                                
Wrong With the Law of Finders and How to Fix It,” 4 GREEN BAG 2d 391 
(2001). 
22 See, e.g., La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. McNamara, 561 So.2d 712, 716 (La. 
1990) (“Although one purpose of such acts is to protect the missing owners, the 
primary rationale behind this legislation is its use as a revenue raising device.”). 
See also 1 DAVID J. EPSTEIN, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAW & REPORTING FORMS 
§ 1.07 (2008). The revenue-raising aspect is not new. In the eighteenth century 
Blackstone listed bona vacantia as one of the sources of royal revenue. 1 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 1, at 288. The sums involved today are enormous. The Wall 
Street Journal (Feb. 4, 2008), citing data from the National Association of Un-
claimed Property Administrators and the state of Delaware, reported that as of 
June 2006 the states collectively held almost $35 billion in unclaimed property. 
Scott Thurm & Pui-Wing Tam, States Scooping Up Assets From Millions of Americans, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2008, at A1. 
23 E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 10(2) (“All property that, after June 30, 1971, shall 
accrue to the State from escheats, unclaimed dividends, or distributive shares of 
the estates of deceased persons shall be used to aid worthy and needy students 
who are residents of this State and are enrolled in public institutions of higher 
education in this State.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-7(a) (2007) (limiting expendi-
ture to income derived from Escheat Fund). Prior to June 30, 1971, such prop-
erty was appropriated by the North Carolina Constitution “to the use of The Uni-
versity of North Carolina.” N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 10(1). See JOHN V. ORTH, 
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 6, 7, 21, 
148-49 (1993). Many state constitutions devote the money more generally to 
educational purposes. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 258 (“the furtherance of edu-
cation”); ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (“[a] permanent State school fund”); COLO. 
CONST. art. IX, § 5 (“[t]he public school fund”); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 4 
(“[t]he public school permanent endowment fund”); IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2 
(“[t]he Common School fund”); MO. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (“the state school 
fund”); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“[t]he public school fund”); NEB. CONST. art. 
VII, § 7 (“perpetual funds for common school purposes, including early childhood 
educational purposes operated by or distributed through the common schools”); 
NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (“for educational purposes”); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 4 
(“the current school fund”); N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“a perpetual trust fund for 
the maintenance of the common schools of the state”); OKLA. CONST. art. X, 
§ 32 (“a State Public Common School Building Equalization Fund”); OR. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 2 (“the Common School Fund”); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“a per-
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Property that is equivalent to cash, such as the balance of an in-
active bank account, is immediately deposited in a designated state 
fund, while marketable property, such as stock in a publicly traded 
corporation, is sold by a state officer – according to a common 
statutory provision, within three years of receipt24 – and the pro-
ceeds of sale are added to the fund. All statutes require the return 
of the property (or its value, if it was sold) to the owner on de-
mand, regardless of how much time has elapsed.25 Under some acts, 
the owner is entitled only to the original value of the property,26 
while other statutes allow the owner of saleable property in addi-
tion any increments that accrued at or prior to sale,27 and still other 
statutes add accumulated interest on the amount taken from inter-
est-bearing accounts for a certain number of years while in the 
state’s custody.28 
                                                                                                
petual fund for the maintenance of public schools in the state”); WASH. CONST. 
art. IX, § 3 (“the common school fund”); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“the school 
fund”); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (“perpetual funds for school purposes”). 
24 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 12 (1995). 
25 Id. § 16. According to the official comment on this section, “The owner’s rights 
are never cut off; under this Act, the owner’s rights exist in perpetuity.” 8C 
U.L.A. 132 (2001). 
26 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-64 (2007) (unclaimed personal property is held 
“without liability for income or gain”); IND. CODE § 32-34-1-30(b) (2002) 
(owner not entitled to receive dividends, interest, or other increments accruing 
after the state takes possession); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1025/15 (2001) (owner 
not entitled to receive income or other increment accruing after state takes pos-
session); OHIO REV. CODE 169.08(D) (2007) (“Interest is not payable to claim-
ants of unclaimed funds held by the state.”). The Supreme Court of Ohio held the 
foregoing statute unconstitutional in Sogg v. Zurz. See infra note 42 and accompa-
nying text. 
27 See state statutes modeled on the UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 21 (1981) (e.g., 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 523A-21 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-41B-22 
(1997)). Prior versions of the uniform act did not provide for payment to the 
owner of any income or other increment accrued after delivery to the state offi-
cer. Id. Comment. 8C U.L.A. 239 (2001). 
28 See state statutes modeled on the UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 11 (1995) 
(interest for up to 10 years at lesser of legal rate or rate paid while held by private 
depository) (e.g., LA. REV. STAT. 9:164 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, 
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The theory by which the states take possession of unclaimed per-
sonal property is unclear. The Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, 
which in one version or another (1954, 1966, 1981, 1995) forms 
the basis for much state legislation, describes the property as “pre-
sumed abandoned,”29 although it emphasizes that the state “does not 
take title to unclaimed property, but takes custody only, and holds 
the property in perpetuity for the owner.”30 The theoretical difficul-
ties are significant. As one appellate court recognized: “While it is 
true that the Act is not a true escheat act, it is also true that it is not 
purely custodial in nature.”31 The right acquired by the state is 
anomalous, sometimes described as “custodial escheat.”32 
Abandoned property is unowned, not unclaimed, and ordinarily 
belongs to the first person to take possession of it.33 Strictly speak-
ing, personal property is abandoned the moment an owner surren-
ders dominion and control with the intention never to reclaim the 
item.34 A common example is an item intentionally deposited in a 
                                                                                                
§ 1962 (1999)). 
29 Id. § 2. 
30 Prefatory Note to the UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995), 8C U.L.A. 89 
(2001). Similar language appeared in the earlier versions of the Act. Id. Any le-
gally protected interest in property is in some sense a “title,” but the distinction 
drawn here is the commonly encountered one between an interest good “against 
all the world” and an interest that is inferior to some other (or others). 
31 Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
32 La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. McNamara, 561 So.2d 712, 717 (La. 1990). 
33 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 3412 (2004) (“Occupancy is the taking of possession 
of a corporeal movable that does not belong to anyone. The occupant acquires 
ownership the moment he takes possession.”). 
34 1 AM. JUR. 2D, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 10 (2005) (“In order to 
establish an abandonment of [personal] property, actual acts of relinquishment, 
accompanied by an intention to abandon, must be shown.”) (footnote omitted). 
Title to real property cannot be abandoned, although interests in real property, 
such as easements, can be. See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 423 at 574 (one-vol. 
ed. by Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan 1968) (“Ownership of land cannot be 
lost by abandonment at common law, even when originally acquired by adverse 
possession . . . . Concerning easements, however, while courts welcome some 
other basis for finding extinguishment, no cases have been found denying the possi-
bility of extinguishment by abandonment, and many easements have been lost this 
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wastebasket. Most instances of abandoned personal property in-
volve a tangible item (chose in possession), not an intangible interest 
such as the ownership of the balance of a bank account or the share 
of ownership in a corporation represented by a stock certificate 
(chose in action). Almost all the personal property taken by the state 
as unclaimed is of the latter type.35 
The presumption of abandonment raised by the statute is rebut-
table at any time since the state never claims title, but only perpet-
ual custody. Ordinarily, non-use of property, even long-continued 
non-use, is not conclusive of an intent to abandon.36 Once rebutted, 
the presumption of abandonment disappears and the owner’s inter-
est is recognized as uninterrupted – relating back to the state’s first 
taking of possession. 
Custody also seems an awkward description of the state’s right 
to unclaimed personal property. Traditionally distinguished from 
bailment by reference to the owner’s intent, custody is transferred 
when the owner places goods in the physical control of another but 
does not intend to surrender dominion over them. The handing of 
goods to a customer in a store to examine under supervision is a 
common example.37 A custodian has physical control and some duty 
to protect and preserve the property for the owner, but state offi-
cers with custody of unclaimed personal property are regularly em-
                                                                                                
way.”) (footnote omitted). 
35 Tangible personal property, such as jewelry or even cash, may be included among 
the contents of an unclaimed safe deposit box. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT 
§ 3 (1995) (concerning “[t]angible property held in a safe deposit box”). 
36 1 AM. JUR. 2D, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 9 (2005) (“[A]ctual intent 
to abandon must be shown; it is not enough that the custodian, into whose hands 
the owner entrusted it, intentionally discarded it. However, if there is no ex-
pressed intent, the intent may be inferred from the acts of the owner. Mere non-
use does not, in itself, constitute abandonment.”) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., 
Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(Spain had not abandoned ship wrecked hundreds of years ago); State v. West, 235 
S.E. 2d 150 (N.C. 1977) (state had not abandoned 200-year-old documents that had 
been lost). 
37 RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 76, at 269 (2d ed. 
1955). 
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powered to commingle the property with other state property and 
use it for state purposes, as well as to sell marketable property, con-
ferring good title on the purchaser.38 Even in the case of statutes 
that provide for accounting to the owner for increments in the value 
of saleable property or for interest on funds taken from interest-
bearing accounts, the accumulation ceases after a period of time, 
despite the assertion that the state is a “perpetual custodian.”39 
The practical significance of the difficulty in identifying the 
state’s right to unclaimed personal property is demonstrated by 
suits brought by owners seeking not just the return of their prop-
erty – which is readily conceded by the state – but also an account-
ing for interest accrued while in the state’s possession. Although 
recent suits have been against states that deny all interest, the same 
claim could eventually be made against states that limit the accumu-
lation of interest or terminate it altogether after a certain number of 
years.40 Some courts have upheld the state’s refusal to account for 
interest on the ground that the proximate cause of the owners’ loss 
was not the state’s action but the owners’ delay,41 while others have 
                                                                                                
38 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 12(c) (1995) (“A purchaser of property at a sale 
conducted by the administrator pursuant to this [Act] takes the property free of 
all claims of the owner or previous holder and of all persons claiming through or 
under them.”). In this section the property is referred to simply as “abandoned,” 
not “presumed abandoned.” 
39 It is true that interest bearing accounts would have continued to accrue interest if 
they had been left with the holder, but the depositor would also have borne the 
risk of loss by the holder’s default or dishonesty. 
40 With respect to saleable unclaimed personal property, statutes limit the owner’s 
accumulation to increments that accrued at or prior to its sale. See, e.g., UNIF. 
UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 21 (1981). Statutes that provide for interest on balances 
taken from interest-bearing accounts limit the amount (lesser of legal rate or rate 
paid while held by private depository) and the period of accumulation (no more 
than 10 years). See, e.g., UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 11 (1995). No statute 
provides for the compounding of interest for the entire period of the state’s po-
tential custody: in perpetuity. If it did, it would implicate the concerns reflected 
in the common-law Rule Against Accumulations of Income. See Thellusson v. 
Woodford, 11 Ves. Jun. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ch. 1805). 
41 See Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Rowlette v. North 
Carolina, 656 S.E.2d 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008), appeal dismissed, 666 S.E.2d 
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held the state’s retention of interest an unconstitutional taking.42 
Even in the latter case, a statute of limitation will eventually bar the 
owner’s claim.43 
IS THE STATE THE LAST HEIR? 
f a person owning real and personal property dies without a valid 
will or known heir, the property passes to the state. In the case of 
escheat of land, the state has title; with respect to bona vacantia, it 
takes title.44 By contrast, unclaimed personal property passes only 
into the state’s “perpetual custody.” The state never claims title. 
Interest earned by unclaimed personal property is another matter. 
Whether denied outright by the statute or limited by it in certain 
ways, title to the interest on unclaimed personal property sooner or 





                                                                                                
487 (N.C. 2008); Smolow v. Hafer, 867 A.2d 767 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
42 See Sogg v. Zurz, 905 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 2009); Canel v. Topinka, 818 N.E.2d 
311 (Ill. 2004). 
43 See Sogg, 905 N.E.2d 187 (applying four-year statute of limitation for conver-
sion). Although it is a maxim of law as well as of economics that “interest follows 
principal,” HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 497 (8th Am. ed. 
1882), interest is nonetheless distinct from principal and may be converted even 
when the principal is not. In similar manner, the state may acquire easements by 
prescription (adverse use), while leaving title to the underlying fee simple unaf-
fected. 
44 Ordinarily, final probate court decisions bar claims by “lost heirs” or devisees 
under previously undiscovered wills. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-108 (3 
years after death of decedent) and 3-412 (sooner of 6 months after filing of clos-
ing statement by personal representative or 12 months after entry of any order). 
In similar fashion, nonclaim statutes bar creditors’ rights. Id. § 3-803 (one year). 
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